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China, Globalisation and Crime: A Potential Victim of Its Own Prospective 
Success? 
 
We are living in a world of global economies. More accurately, and more worryingly 
perhaps, we are living in a world of aspiring global economies. There are many 
countries who have until now been unable to enrich their economies through ordinary 
industrial growth. In part, this was because they lacked the requisite financial sources 
to do so; in part it was due to increasing, if unfair, western moratoria on ecologically 
damaging latent development. The beauty and potential danger of the Internet-driven 
economy lies in the ability of the emerging economies to create and sustain at least 
the illusion of industrial and capitalist parity with the developed economies of the 
west until such time that that parity is actually achieved.  The problem with illusions 
however is that they require creative misdirection. The dangers of such sleights of 
hand being utilised by emerging economies are potentially grave.  
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
maintained that e-commerce lies at the very heart of the future of globalisation
1
. For 
emerging economies the nature and increased volume and complexity of e-trading 
increases the centrality for them of e-commerce. 
Equally, the OECD also argues that “[d]eveloping new kinds of commercial activities 
in the electronic environment largely hinges on assuring consumers and businesses 
that their use of network services is secure, reliable and verifiable.”2 In pursuing the 
economic importance of e-commerce, however, the OECD had actually neglected to 
fully consider the concept and importance of security in e-commerce. Qu Yuan,  
writing over 2000 years ago, argued that “[a]ll the world is drunk and I alone am 
sober.”3 Applied to the security void evidenced by the OECD, his words border on the 
prophetic. 
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Globalisation requires, and will continue to necessitate, an increased connectivity of 
the world‟s computer, banking and financial systems.  Globalisation has increased the 
free movement of capital between the world‟s developed and underdeveloped 
economies. Globalisation operates in cyberspace which by definition is 
extraterritorial.
4
 This means that the regulatory practices which purport to exist and 
operate in the land-locked world, and which should be the sine qua non of the 
globalised economy, are missing. The Economist notes that “…much of the 
dynamism in global finance…has been due to fewer regulations on the movement of 
capital, particularly across borders, and on what can be done with it.”5 It goes on to 
posit an accurate but potentially dangerous truism that “[f]or the most part, money is 
now free to flow wherever an opportunity presents itself, and has generally done so, 
leaving everybody better off than with heavy regulation.”6 The OECD maintains, 
somewhat ironically, that there is “…little enthusiasm for a global system of 
regulation for e-commerce. In global electronic commerce the realities of the 
borderless world of cyberspace run headlong into geographically delimited national 
jurisdictions of sovereign states. International law and global international legal 
institutions certainly exist, but in the burgeoning global digital economy there are 
enormous difficulties in obtaining agreement on a global basis.”7 
 
Principally, the OECD is against the notion of global regulation of e-commerce for 
fear of creating a perception of discrimination against those countries whose systems 
may not equate with more developed economies. The price to be paid for basing a 
rationale of non-co-operation on the digital divide that exists between emerged and 
emerging economies will be a real and definite criminal infiltration of both. Indeed, 
the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice has noted that “[a]s the 
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degree of reliance placed on networks increases, the potential harm from criminal 
offences also increases.”8 
 
There are, however, few such reservations on the part of transnational organised crime 
groups. Strategic alliances already exist between Mexican and Colombian drugs 
cartels, between Mexican and Chinese human traffickers and between Sicilian and 
Colombian drugs traffickers.
9
  
 
As Williams notes “…cooperation among these organisations is only a natural activity 
particularly as they share the common problem of circumventing law enforcement and 
national regulations.”10 Ironically, Western and emerging economies do not seem to 
be of the same mind when attempting to deal with their shared common problem – the 
infiltration by those organised crime groups. 
 
The organised crime groups‟ success lies, according to Williams, in “…the diversity 
of these organisations, their symbiotic relationships with legitimate businesses, their 
capacity to exploit (rather than disrupt) legitimate trading activity and financial 
institutions, and the ability to corrupt governments and law enforcement agencies.”11 
            Crime, like nature, abhors a vacuum. It seems inevitable that within China, organised 
crime groups will positively rush to fill that void.
12
 
A prime example of the systemic nature of transnational organised crime groups‟ 
lateral thinking and exploitative powers was witnessed in October 2000 when a 
Sicilian mafia group, together with twenty other strategically placed individuals, 
created a digital clone of the Bank of Sicily‟s online component. Its plan, thwarted at 
the last moment by an informant, involved the diversion of $400 million allocated to 
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the Bank by the European Union for regional projects within Sicily
13
. The fact that the 
group tried and failed is not the issue. That they actually conceived the idea is. It does 
not take too much imagination to envisage the havoc that might be unleashed were the 
evident flaws within China‟s computer infrastructure to be exploited by transnational 
crime groups in a similar fashion. 
As a prelude to an examination of China‟s role in globalisation, it might be prudent to 
examine the fate of the Former Soviet Union (FSU), especially that of Russia, given 
that Russia too was once part of an omnipotent Communist system. Georgy Satarov, 
president of INDEM (a Russian think-tank) noted
14
 in May 2002 that Russian 
companies paid £25 billion in bribes and unofficial charges, an amount equating to 
12% of Russia‟s GDP. The recipients of the largest bribes are members of the 
judiciary, the same judiciary responsible for ensuring that the financial and banking 
regulations are enforced through the courts. The black economy, grown large by dint 
of the collapse of the FSU, accounts for 35% of the economic activity in Russia
15
. 
The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) argues
16
 that Russia is 
already a „criminal-syndicalist‟ state, comprising corrupt officials at all levels of 
government, successful full time professional criminals (the Russian Mafiya), and 
businessmen who seem to regard Russian law and Western norms of commerce, 
respectively, not as barriers to be respected but as mere obstacles to circumvent.
17
 
The CSIS maintains that “corruption at all levels of government had long been the 
lubricant that made the Soviet system work. In the Soviet Union, the system was the 
State itself; in a transforming Russia, it is corruption which allows organised crime to 
function.”18 Indeed, as Shelley points out, “[t]he pervasive corruption and penetration 
of organized [sic] crime into the political process are inhibiting the development of 
new laws needed as a foundation for a democratic free market economy.”19 
 5 
The Russian Mafiya purportedly runs 40% of private business, 50% of banks and 60% 
of state-owned companies.
20
 They have already infiltrated the USA through activities 
such as daisy-chaining
21
 fuel scams and have entered the transnational trade in sex 
trafficking to such an extent that the trade is now known generically as the Natasha 
trade
22. Russia remains on the Financial Action Task Force‟s (FATF) list of Non-Co-
operative Countries and Territories, despite Putins‟s valiant attempts to introduce and 
enforce money laundering legislation. Ironically, the USA maintained in June 2002
23
 
that Russia was now a fully-fledged market economy, one with which, presumably, it 
wishes to trade. This position ignores the fact, as noted by the Economist in the same 
month, that Russia “…is governed by forces that might politely be described as 
unusual – including highly politicised subsidies for energy, transport and credit, a 
welter of organised crime, and arbitrary bureaucratic interference.”24 The reason for 
the USA‟s apparently blinkered approach is summed up neatly by the Economist 
when it supposes that “…the laws of supply and demand certainly matter a lot more 
than they once did.”25 Not for the first time in the world of commerce in general, and 
e-commerce in particular, justifiable concern has given way to economic pressure. If 
the USA, and by definition, the rest of the Western global economies, are willing to 
trade with Russia whilst simultaneously condoning the rank criminality within Russia, 
it seems likely that they will also turn a collective blind eye to the rank corruption that 
exists within China. Therein lies a true recipe for disaster in the process of 
globalisation. Indeed, China‟s increased and increasing level of trade with Russia26 
may lead to China‟s fragile financial system becoming a conduit for Russian criminal 
proceeds. 
Although China has witnessed momentous changes it has not yet undergone Russia‟s 
perestroika or glasnost. However, it is, particularly after its entry into the World 
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Trade Organisation (WTO), moving rapidly from a centrally planned to a socialist 
market economy. The corruption that pervades Russia and has precipitated many of 
its current problems is present in China also. 
Time noted, in February 2002, in connection with China‟s WTO entry that “China has 
long played the inert Panda to Asia‟s tiger economies, but this year the panda grows 
fangs.”27 Morgan Stanley‟s Chief Economist, echoing this sentiment, said, “[w]hen 
[globalisation] is all over China will be the largest exporter in the world.”28 
Roston and Fonda note, however, that “..in written Chinese, the same ideogram is 
used to express both danger and opportunity.”29 
China can certainly boast one of the most dynamic emerging economies. The average 
annual growth rate of China‟s GDP between 1990 and 1999 was 10.7%.30 For 
governments and MNEs (multi-national enterprises) outside of China, China‟s 
population of over 1, 249.6 billion people
31
 and its strong manufacturing base which 
accounts for 49.3%
32
 of its GDP represents a potentially lucrative market. 
However, this trading must be carried out in an honest and secure environment. The 
Centre for Security Policy argues (conservatively perhaps
33
) that corruption in China 
accounts for between four and eight percent of GDP
34
. Such corruption pervades 
everyday life in China such that it constitutes normality. Even the symbol of China‟s 
modernisation process – the Three Gorges dam – is affected. As Ridding has reported 
recently, “[c]orruption is a constant threat – to the dam‟s physical structure as well as 
its financial underpinnings.”35 The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences noted that 
“unless the problem of corruption is genuinely tackled as a systemic issue, it could 
become the main cause of social turmoil.”36 The culture of all-pervading corruption37 
per se is unlikely to change as rapidly as the needs of the globalising economic 
system in China demands that it should.  As Myers puts it, “[t]he introduction of 
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capitalism into the guanxi
38
 dominated society of the People‟s Republic of China has 
proven an explosive mixture, spawning economic success on the one hand and an 
ungovernable society riddled with corruption on the other.”39 It is the apparent pre-
eminence of guanxi that supports and perpetuates the corruption which leaves the 
future security of the economy in jeopardy. As Yao notes, “…the presence of 
privilege in China‟s political system is the fundamental cause of implicit corruption in 
the short run and of explicit corruption in the long run.”40 
Johnston argues that “reforms and growth have created new opportunities and much 
higher incentives for illicit connections between wealth and power.”41 The Economist 
noted in February 2002 that the annual capital flight from China between 1991 and 
2000 rose from $10 billion to more than $45 billion
42
. 
In May 2002, Wang Xuebing, the Bank of Construction‟s President, was dismissed 
from office
43
 and is now under investigation for fraud. Wang had been at the Bank of 
China‟s New York branch but had been discredited by an American Treasury 
investigation
44
. The Chinese government, it is reputed
45
, must have known of his 
malfeasance. That fraud occurred was worrying. That it was systematically hidden 
was more worrying still. 
In November 2001 Ernst and Young found
46
 that almost half of the loans made by 
Chinese banks might never be repaid. Given that the four main state banks account for 
66% of lending and 60% of deposits
47
 and that the official government figure for non-
payment is 25%
48
 (as opposed to the 50% estimated by Lardy of the Brookings 
Institution
49
) there is understandable and rising concern over the fact and 
consequences of such financial mismanagement. 
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In February 2002 China‟s only private bank (with whom Western businesses might 
prefer to conduct business) was embroiled in a fraud scandal involving a loan for $43 
million made to one of its own tellers.
50
 
China‟s national audit office found that $320 million of the Bank of China‟s funds 
had been diverted from a number of branches via a number of stratagems including 
unlawful loans.
51
 In March 2002, the Bank of China revealed the theft by five of its 
officials of $500 million.
52
 As Li Peng
53
 warned in a broader but nevertheless relevant 
context, “[h]istorical experience has proved that the exercise of power without 
restraint and supervision inevitably leads to corruption.”54 Applied to the banking 
situation in China, it resonates. It is somewhat ironic, therefore, that the People‟s 
Bank of China participated (as a member of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS)) in the drafting and revision of the 25 core principles for effective banking 
supervision laid down in the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 
1997. Indeed, in 1999, Tang Xu of the Bank of China argued that “[a]n effective 
banking system in keeping with the Basel core principles has taken shape in China.”55 
 
Mr Lui, of the Bank of China, recently admitted, though perhaps it was by then self-
evident, that it suffered from a “…lack of integrity, compliance, discipline and 
transparency…”56  The Bank of China has also accepted that “[f]or a commercial 
bank in the market economy, the criteria of healthy operation include sound corporate 
governance on the one hand, adequate capital and ability to control and deal with bad 
debts timely on the other.”57The various thefts and diversion of huge amounts of 
capital and the massive number of unjustified loans show clearly that such laudable 
criteria do not pertain to the Chinese banking system and this raises, as Business 
Week put it in February 2002, “troublesome questions about China‟s ability to 
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regulate its financial system, even as that system is being thrown open to the forces of 
the free markets.”58 
The OECD notes that the financial system in China “performs inadequately in 
carrying out several of its basic functions in the economy.”59  It has “limited scope for 
transferring funds among financial institutions or regions”60 and that “[t]he external 
discipline provided by the financial system has been a major weakness. Years of 
government mandated lending and weak contract enforcement has created a distorted 
credit culture in which banks have had limited incentives – and even less ability – to 
maintain strict lending standards and enforce loan agreements.”61 In January 2002 the 
Director of the Fund Management Division at the Chinese Securities and Regulatory 
Commission reprimanded fund managers on the Chinese stock market for speculative 
share-dealing on such a scale that the stock market itself could, in his view, have been 
destabilised.
62
 
Ironically, in 2001, the CSRC had noted that “[t]he complexity of Internet technology 
greatly increases the difficulty of effectively monitoring on-line information. It is 
reported that the success rate for investigating and handling the fraud cases are 
relatively low…It will take some time for the current legislation to be adapted to the 
new technology.”63 
To add to the difficulties posed by China‟s relatively slow development, the CSRC is 
also somewhat constricted by the Chinese government. Chang argues that “…the 
nation‟s stock watchdog seems to be a captive of the industry it is supposed to 
regulate – this dog just watches all the problems and barks only when prompted.”64 
More specifically, the OECD has noted generally that “China‟s financial regulatory 
and supervisory authorities face especially great challenges given the adverse 
incentives inherent in extensive state ownership of financial institutions.”65 The 
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OECD maintains further that “…supervisory authorities still lack full control over 
some basic prudential standards, such as the power to impose realistic norms for bank 
provisioning and loan write-offs”66. The fact that the CSRC has been given the 
responsibility but not the requisite power for regulating the stock exchanges, bond 
markets and securities and investment companies
67
 does not augur well for the 
soundness or security of a financial system which will eventually go online in 
response to the increased connectivity required by globalisation.  Indeed, as things 
currently stand, Chang notes that “…the exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen are 
infested, plagued by market manipulation, insider trading, accounting fraud, outright 
theft, and a dozen other corrupt practices.”68 The Chinese government may believe 
that they are establishing, through entities like the CSRC, a market-based regulatory 
system. The point they are missing, however, is that “…regulation is not simply a 
collection of laws and regulations in individual areas but a process in its own right.”69 
Witherell has noted recently that “[r]ecent high profile cases of governance failure 
and corporate misconduct…have shown that corporate governance mechanisms 
sometimes have not kept up with market developments.”70 In the USA, Enron 
overstated its profits by almost $600 million. Andersen, the supposedly objective 
auditors shredded Enron-related documentation when it discovered that the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) had launched an investigation into Enron‟s 
accounting. WorldCom recorded losses over five quarters (from the beginning of 
2001) as profits and Xerox overstated its profits by $1.4 billion over a five year 
period
71
. There were several other less high profile admissions of corporate 
malfeasance
72
 and undoubtedly hundreds of others currently hide behind the 
camouflage of corporate responsibility. Companies like these were already successful 
by-products of the globalisation process. They had already achieved dominance 
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within their respective niches in the market. They were, theoretically, controlled by 
and accountable to a strict regulatory system. However, corporate greed led to 
corporate malfeasance and whether such behaviour was caused by the apparent 
common denominator of business the world over – profit – or whether they were 
simply suffering from globalisation engendered competitive stress does not matter. 
What matters is that it raises the question as to the lengths China, a relatively new, 
under-developed, under-regulated and quasi-capitalist economy might go in order to 
achieve the illusion of industrial parity referred to above, especially when increased 
trade in general, and the commitments made as a pre-requisite of WTO membership
73
 
in particular, focus financial attention more and more upon the reality of China‟s 
economic stature. As a member of WorldCom recently noted, “[t]here were no 
rewards for saving the company from a potential loss. There were only rewards for 
doing a deal that could outwardly be reported as revenue or earnings.”74 There are 
inevitable moves afoot within the USA to mitigate the perceptual and actual harm 
done to its financial sector
75
 for as Goldstein (of the Institute for International 
Economics) has argued “[t]here have been enough serious breakdowns in corporate 
governance, accounting, auditing and investment banking to make everyone worry.”76 
In this regard, the Economist notes, for example, that “[s]ince Enron, Congress and 
the administration have been talking about reforms to the regulation of auditing and 
the setting of accounting standards.”77 They might usefully and crucially, however, 
examine the role, or lack of thereof, of the SEC. As Coffee
78
 has argued, with 
admirable understatement,  “[t]he SEC…has been something of a reluctant 
regulator.”79 
In relation to China‟s regulatory oversight, however, there remains a more pressing 
problem. As Crockett puts it, “[w]eaknesses in the financial infrastructure can render 
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useless the most careful supervisory oversight.”80 China suffers from poor oversight 
of a poor financial system and that combination of factors is destined to cause severe 
problems. 
The future of e-trading and globalisation lies in the utilisation and utility of cyber 
payment systems such as e-cash (whether in smart card or computer-based form). As 
Fisse and Leonard have argued, “[t]he more automated the banking and financial 
system becomes, the less face to face contact between clients and employees and the 
greater the holes in the detection net…”81, a process known as disintermediation82. 
Schaechter argues that, in relation to e-banking, “[t]he dependence on technology for 
providing the services with the necessary security, and the cross-border nature of 
transactions, involve additional risks for banks and new challenges for banking 
regulators and supervisors.”83 
If the supervision of China‟s banking system has been so lax as to permit the 
aforementioned
84
 criminal diversion of funds to occur, one cannot really place too 
much faith in its ability to adapt to the security challenges posed by cyberpayment 
systems at all, let alone in time to prevent mass infiltration and abuse of the global 
market. The BCBS drew up specific e-banking principles in May 2001
85
. They 
concern themselves with risk management for electronic banking, clearly the future of 
e-commerce and, on the OECD‟s logic86, globalisation. In broad terms, the fourteen 
principles alluded to necessitate, inter alia, “..effective management oversight”87, the 
establishment of an “..ongoing due diligence and oversight process88” and the 
promotion of “…adequate segregation of duties within e-banking systems..”89 and 
require the relevant banks to ensure that “..clear audit trails exist for all e-banking 
transactions.”90 It has to be acknowledged that even with the most optimistic of 
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outlooks the likelihood of such criteria being met, given China‟s track record of 
adherence to the land-based Basel principles, is slim.  
 
The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) of the US Department of 
Treasury argues that “inadequately regulated or unregulated electronic banking 
systems may be used to conduct anonymous transactions and to obscure audit trails, 
acts that may facilitate money laundering and hinder traditional investigative 
techniques, especially those requiring the analysis of financial records.”91 The number 
and variety of crimes that might be committed through the use or abuse of computer 
systems is already legion
92
. As far as money laundering in particular is concerned, 
Molander et al
93
 have maintained that the ease with which cyberpayment systems 
operate is a double-edged sword. As they put it, “[t]he international dimension of 
these systems, and the fact that value transfers may take place with rapidity and with a 
degree of anonymity that impedes oversight by governmental authorities, is clearly a 
serious concern.”94 Further, the FATF have noted the dangers inherent in new 
payment technologies and online banking
95. Schroeder has argued that “emerging 
market countries are particularly vulnerable to laundering as they begin to open their 
financial sectors, sell government-owned assets and establish fledgling markets.”96 As 
has been observed already, the risk to China‟s financial system, and by definition to 
the systems of any countries that trade with China, is high. This may be particularly 
so given the FATF‟s recent observation97 concerning co-ordinated money laundering 
among organised crime groups, the potential impact of such groups having already 
been noted
98
. 
Given that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates global laundering to 
account for between two and five percent of global GDP ($600 billion to $1.5 
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trillion)
99
 it is a threat China needs to note carefully. China is not, unlike Russia, on 
the FATF‟s NCCT100 list101, but it does appear (as do, inter alia, the UK, Hong Kong 
and the US) in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
102
 as a country of 
primary concern because of its potential to become a centre for laundering activity. 
Those institutions which host (wittingly or otherwise) the money laundering activity 
are increasingly asked to create, enforce and adhere to a wealth of laws, conventions 
and regulations which operate nationally, regionally and internationally. The fact that 
such laws appear to treat the professional service providers who perpetrate the 
laundering as naïve and accidental malfeasants
103
 renders the overall global success of 
such intervention unlikely. More locally, if the way in which the banking sector in 
China is regulated is the litmus test for its prospective success in dealing with money 
laundering then money laundering control within China is likely to be poorly attended 
to.  
More generally, in a test of e-readiness
104
 (the extent to which an economy is 
conducive to e-business) of the world‟s sixty largest economies, China was ranked 
45
th
. To contextualise this, India (a less developed rather than emerging economy) 
was placed 49
th
. The computer infrastructure in China is under-developed and, 
relative to the economies it seeks to business with, unsecure. Indeed, the OECD has 
noted that “[i]nadequate technology and limited capacity to innovate are particular 
weaknesses of much of Chinese industry.”105The Chinese government has, arguably, 
added to that security concern by insisting on attempting to control the availability 
and content of web traffic. Attempting to control the Internet per se and certainly 
within the context of a globalised economy in which Western companies will be 
loathe to ignore the potential of the Chinese market, will undoubtedly lead to covert 
infiltration by those companies. Organised crime groups will exploit this level of 
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uncertainty for as Savona notes, “criminal organisations go where opportunities are 
and the process of globalisation helps the expansion.”106 
Security within companies within Western economies is, relative to potential threat, a 
low priority
107. As Butler has argued, “although business was quick to recognise the 
advantages to be gained from improving connections to the outside world, a 
corresponding awareness of the unique vulnerabilities of such enhanced connectivity 
has been far slower to develop.”108 That corporations lack the requisite awareness is 
evidenced by the number of viral infections and the effectiveness of denial of service 
attacks the systems have been subject to. Where security is raised, it is invariably 
raised in the context of treating security as a problem to be solved rather than a 
holistic process to be observed. The security of China‟s computer systems is, given 
the state of its banking and finance sectors and level of corruption, unlikely to be a 
priority. Indeed, as with most western businesses, if security breaches do occur they 
are unlikely to be reported. China, as a newly welcomed member of the WTO could 
not afford the negative impact. In consequence, China could become one of the weak 
links in the already weak chain of globalisation security. 
Although not often mooted, the current global political climate may well render China 
an amenable target for terrorists and anti-globalisation protesters. Bin Laden saw the 
widespread economic impact of September 11
th
 upon the capitalist economies of the 
world.  The Economist noted that despite the overall resolve shown by the financial 
system after the attacks, the attacks nevertheless indicated that “…even where 
capitalism is well established, it is increasingly vulnerable to those who hate it.”109  
Given that the eradication of capitalism, or at least the brand of capitalism practised 
by the USA and its immediate allies,  is Bin Laden‟s  raison d’être it seems inevitable 
that the globalisation process will become his new focus. It seems equally likely 
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therefore that fledgling globalising economies will constitute easier and, given 
increased western investment in them, more devastating targets in the ongoing war 
against globalisation. 
Michael Vatis, a former head of the FBI‟s National Infrastructure Protection Center 
[sic] notes “we have seen a clear decision by terrorist groups like Al Qaeda to focus 
on critical infrastructures, financial networks and power grids.”110  
Russia, a globalising emerging economy, is already fearful of movement in this 
direction. Department R of the Moscow police is Russia‟s Communication Security 
Branch. Their key focus in now digital crime. The head of Department R said “[t]his, 
unfortunately, is the future face of terrorism.”111 
Trott reported in March 2001 that anti-globalisation protesters maintain
112
 that the 
Internet age is exacerbating the inequality that globalisation per se represents because 
it both pressures development and increases the digital divide between developed and 
emerging economies. The OECD has noted
113
 that China‟s economic growth has 
actually led to a growing inequality among its regions, with the coastal provinces 
seeing incomes and living standards rise and the western provinces seeing them fall. 
Needs which are not met successfully by government are inevitably met by organised 
crime. Infiltration into the population of China will make criminal infiltration into 
other sectors all the easier. Chelsea Mozen, an anti-globalisation protester, said after 
September 11
th, “I believe the terrorism was awful and horrible, but so is what the 
IMF does.”114 
The US Department of Defence defines terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or 
the threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate 
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious 
or ideological.”115 
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Anti-globalisation protesters share, with Bin Laden, an unobtainable goal – the 
removal of capitalism or at least a minimisation of its perceived exploitative nature. 
Equating, as Mozen does, September 11
th
 with the policies pursued by the IMF 
indicates that the transition from violent demonstrations on the streets of Seattle to 
non-violent disruption of the computer networks which support global economies is 
not so far away as one might have imagined. China would present the perfect target 
for terrorists and anti-globalisation protesters especially once the other WTO 
members have invested their billions of trade dollars and China supplies the world 
with a substantial volume of its products. 
For the globalisation process to take precedence over the safety of the economic, 
political and financial systems that underpin it, is, particularly in China‟s case, a 
travesty. As Confucius had it, “[t]o see what is right and not to do it is want of 
courage.”116 Unfortunately for China, the fear of not being part of the globalisation 
process is as much a driving force as the prospect of suffering at its hands. 
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